Trade Regulation—Clayton Act Section 3—Requirement Contracts—Substantial Share of Relevant Market—Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. by Martin, Robert J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 35
4-1-1961
Trade Regulation—Clayton Act Section
3—Requirement Contracts—Substantial Share of
Relevant Market—Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co.
Robert J. Martin
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Martin, Trade Regulation—Clayton Act Section 3—Requirement Contracts—Substantial
Share of Relevant Market—Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 2 B.C.L. Rev. 442 (1961),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol2/iss2/35
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
omitted, the taxpayer will strive for accuracy in depreciation and the Gov-
ernment will theoretically be in the same position regardless of whether the
asset was correctly depreciated."
EDWARD A. SCHWARTZ
Trade Regulation—Clayton Act Section 3—Requirement Contracts—
Substantial Share of Relevant Market.—Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co. 1—Tampa Electric, a public utility situated in peninsular Florida,
supplies electric energy to some eleven percent of Florida's population.
Having started the construction of a new generating plant, Tampa entered
into a contract by which it was obligated to buy the total coal requirements
of two of the plant's contemplated six units from Nashville Coal Co. for a
twenty year period. Nashville Coal was only one of 700 coal producers in
the Appalachian coal area who could serve Tampa. Previous to this contract,
every electrical generating plant in peninsular Florida burned oil as burner
fuel. Tampa's coal requirements were expected to vary between one and two
million tons per year, at a minimum cost of $128,000,000 over the twenty
year contract term. Thus, within a few years of the contract starting date,
the utility's coal consumption would surpass that of the remainder of the
state. Just prior to the contract starting date, Nashville notified Tampa that
it would not perform because the contract was in violation of the federal
antitrust laws.2 Tampa Electric brought declaratory judgment proceedings
against Nashville to have the contract declared valid and enforceable. The
District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment 3 and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court
reversed. HELD: the contract does not violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act as the competition foreclosed by the contract does not constitute a
substantial share of the relevant market.
The "rule of reason" test developed in interpreting the Sherman Act. 5
It necessitated, in each case, an analysis of the case in the light of a broad
public policy, hospitable to competition and cold to monopoly, to see
17 "Theoretically" is used because the taxpayer could have changed tax brackets
since deducting the depreciation allowances.
1 81 Sup. Ct. 623 (1961).
2 "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods .. . for use, consump-
tion, or resale within the United States . • . on the condition, agreement, or understand-
ing that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a
competitor or competitors of the . . . seller where the effect of such lease, sale, or con-
tract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C, 14 (1958). Respondents also argued that the contract violated the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat, 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §¢ 1-2 (1958).
3 168 .F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
4 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960).
5
 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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whether the conduct under scrutiny was unreasonably anticompetitive.°
At first, the "rule of reason" was also applied to the Clayton Act,' but
the Supreme Court later rejected it in the celebrated Standard Stations
case,8
 wherein it was stated that any such application would defeat the
purpose of the Act. There, the true test—the "quantitative substantiality"
test—for discerning whether exclusive arrangements violated Section 3 of
the Clayton Act was set out: Has competition been foreclosed in a sub-
stantial share of the line of commerce affected? If there has been such a
foreclosure, then violation is inferred, since such foreclosure gives rise to
a probability that competition will be substantially lessened, or that a
monopoly will be created. In applying this "quantitative substantiality"
test, the dominant market position of the supplier, or a large volume of
business are important considerations" In the opinion, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter emphasized that certain factors not to be considered include: (I) that
competition has flourished despite the contracts, (2) the length of the term
of the contract as compared with the reasonable requirements of the type
of commerce involved, and (3) the economic desirability of the contract to
the buyer."' The net result of this position was thought to be that, prac-
tically speaking, any exclusive dealing contract involving a large volume
of business would be in contravention to the antitrust laws. Little help
was forthcoming to solve this dilemma. Some found a glimmer of hope in
a statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter as to this concept of foreclosure.n
Foreclosure, in his view, is to be analyzed in terms of market dominance and
the obvious bargaining power of the seller, with definite but lesser importance
being given to the number of outlets committed to exclusive arrangements.
Not only is the "quantitative substantiality" test hard to define; it is
also uncertain in application.'` The perfect example is supplied by the
instant case. Seemingly without difficulty, the Court arrived at the con-
clusion that the relevant market was the area in which Nashville and the
other 700 coal producers effectively compete." The relevant market area
6 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 11 (1955).
7 Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 282 Fed. 81 (3d Cir. 1922), aff'd, 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
s Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
9 In the Standard Stations case the supplier's requirement contracts affected a gross
business of $58,000,000 or 6.7% of the total in the relevant market. Cf. Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
10 Supra note 8, at 308-14.
11 F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401-03 (1953)
(dissenting opinion).
12 See Report of the Att'y Gen% supra note 6, at 141-2; Johnson, Antitrust Law:
An Approach to Some Common Problems, 45 A.B.A.J. 596 (1959); Kessler & Stern,
Competition, Contract & Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1, 24-37 (1959) ; Lockhart &
Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrange-
ments Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913 (1952).
13 Both the Court of Appeals and the District Courrconsidered the relevant market
to be peninsular Florida; cf. supra note 1, at 627. When the Court here considers
the relevant market to be a large national area supplied by these 700 producers (See
Brief for Petitioners, p. 42), it makes applicable Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in United
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being so large, Tampa consumed less than one per cent of the coal pro-
duced." But this factor evidently, was not a sufficient basis for the Court
to say that Section 3 was not violated, in view of the fact that the contract
ran for twenty years and involved at least $128,000,000. As a result, stress
was given to the less than dominant position of Nashville, the fact that only
one outlet was encompassed, and the type of industry involved. As to this
last, the Court noted that, "at least in the case of public utilities the assur-
ance of a steady and ample supply of fuel is necessary in the public interest.
Otherwise consumers are left unprotected against service failures owing to
shut-downs; and increasingly unjustified costs might result in more burden-
some rate structures eventually to be reflected in the consumer's bill.""
(emphasis supplied). Can it be said that the economic desirability of the
contract is a valid consideration under the test laid out in Standard
Stations?' 6
While it is true that the number of outlets involved in an exclusive
arrangement, the dominant position of the seller, and his obvious bargaining
power, have been used before in applying the yardstick of "quantitative
substantiality,"" other economic factors have been rejected; the reason
being that such would result in a "determination in each case [of] the
ultimate demands of 'public interest,' "" i.e., a retrogression to the for-
bidden "rule of reason." In other words, in applying Section 3 of the
Clayton Act to a given set of facts, one should not consider the purpose of
the particular contract or the end desired from same. Yet, in the instant
case, the Supreme Court hesitated to enforce the contract after applying
the "quantitative substantiality" test. Rather, it pointed out that the buyer
was a peculiar type, a public utility, that shut-downs would be fatal to
the consumer, and that such a contract was required to maintain stable
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 538 (1948), "There is no safeguarding of com-
petition in the theory that the bigger the national market the less protection will be
given those selling to the smaller components thereof. That theory would allow a
producer to absorb outlets upon which small enterprises with restricted marketing
facilities depend. Those outlets ... could be a matter of life and death to small, local
enterprises."
14 The Court, in delineating the relevant market area of competition to be that
area in which the 700 producers effectively compete, followed the pattern set out by the
Court in Standard Stations, Note, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1188, 1192 (1960). But it neg-
lected to take the extra step of Mr. Justice Brennan in United States v. E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), where he said that "the bounds of the relevant
market for the purposes of this case are not coextensive with the total market for
finishes and fabrics, but are coextensive with the automobile industry, the relevant
market for automotive finishes and fabrics." (594-95). If the relevant market here was
considered to be coal used by public utilities then Tampa would have consumed 2.86%
of the total coal consumed by the public utilities.
15 Supra note 1, at 632.
16 Cf. text accompanying note 10 supra.
17
 Standard Stations, supra note 8; Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) ; Standard Fashions, supra note 9.
18
 Standard Stations, supra note 8, at 311. For an excellent statement of the "rule
of reason" see Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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prices. But, what relevance this public interest consideration had, was not
made clear. If any it had, such would appear to be at least a partial retreat
to public policy considerations so as to uphold the contract.
It would seem that the Court might have been able to reach the same
result by means of another tack, which would not have entailed any public
interest examination. As was stated above, the Court in Standard Stations
eliminated consideration of economic data other than the relative positions
of the parties, bargaining power of the seller, number of outlets foreclosed,
length of contract term and the volume of the contract, so as to lessen the
chance of return to the "rule of reason." Another rationale for this reluc-
tance to investigate the economics of a given case hinges on the notion that
courts are not equipped to handle a detailed economic evaluation.I 9 Yet,
if the Clayton Act is to be kept free from the "rule of reason," and at the
same time large-volume exclusive arrangements are not to be arbitrarily
struck down, an analysis of some of the heretofore prohibited economic
evidence would appear to be the only way to attain both these ends. 2°
The Federal Trade Commission has adopted this alternative. In a
series of decisions the Commission has required "evidence relating to the
competitive effect of the exclusive dealing provisions."2' Various factors
found to be relevant in this area include whether there has been a growth
or decline in the particular industry, whether the exclusive arrangement
has increased the supplier's share of the market, or, in lieu of the last,
whether such arrangements, as used by comparable suppliers, have lessened
competition. In a sense the Commission has repudiated the "quantitative
substantiality" test, and it will reverse a finding of a violation of Section 3
of the Clayton Act, if the latter is solely based on inferences arising from
the test.22
 However, evidence tending to show economic merit, expediency
or necessity—the public interest arguments—has been excluded,23
 By
admitting evidence tending to show the competitive effect of these exclusive
dealing contracts and excluding such as would justify these same contracts,
the Federal Trade Commission has in no way frustrated Congress' intent
10 Standard Stations, supra note 8, at 310.
20 Report of the Att'y Gen'l, supra note 6, at 146. One writer suggests that three
questions be asked before finding a violation: "(1) whether there are other legitimate
interests that are served by the practice in question; (2) if so, whether those interests
can or cannot be served by less restrictive alternatives; and (3) if they cannot, whether
the contribution made by the restrictive practice is likely to be outweighed by the
harm." Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 50, 59 (1958).
21
 Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485, 486 (1953). Cf. Anchor Serum Co. v. F.T.C., 50
F.T.C. 681 (1954), aff'd, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Dictograph Prod., Inc. v.. F.T.C.,
50 F.T.C. 281 (1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954); Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co.,
52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956); Revlon Prod. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954); Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954).
22 Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
23
 Anchor Serum Co. v. F.T.C., 50 F.T.C. 681 (1954); Dictograph Prod., Inc. v.
F.T.C., 50 F.T.0 281 (1953)
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to strike down, in their incipiency, such contracts as may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create monopolies.
ROBERT J. MARTIN
Trade Regulation—Robinson-Patman Act—Knowledge of Violation
Imputed to Members of Buyers' Association by Way of Trade Experi-
ence.—American Motor Specialties, Inc. v. F.T.C.'---It had been the
custom of major suppliers in the automotive parts industry to offer jabbers
successively increasing percentage reductions off their list prices for spec-
ified increases in dollar volume purchases. These cumulative volume rebates
'and graduated price schedules were accorded all purchasers and were
available generally throughout the industry. Certain companies engaged
as jobbers in the sale and distribution of automotive parts formed a buying
group to which suppliers were requested to submit their price schedules.
After the prices of a certain supplier had been approved by a committee,
the member firms would place their individual orders with the buying
group, i.e., the orders were written on forms bearing the name of the buying
group, but these forms were either sent by the individual firm directly to
the supplier or were sent through the group office without any consolidation
of member orders. The orders were processed by the supplier in the same
manner as if they had been received directly from the individual jobber
instead of in the name of the buying group, and the volume rebates were
computed on the basis of the total purchases for all member-jobbers. After
deducting operating expenses of the buying group these rebates were distrib-
uted to member-jobbers in proportion to each jobber's purchases for the
year. The effect of this was to give member-jobbers a substantially lower
cost than would have been paid for the same kind and quantity of goods
by such jobber individually or by a competing jobber. The granting of
these volume discounts by suppliers had previously been held violative
of § 2(a) 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 3 In this case the Commission issued
I 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
2 "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, either di-
rectly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchasers
involved in such discrimination are in commerce ... where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent com-
petition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination or with customers of either of them . . ." 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § I3(a) (1958).
3 Standard Motors Products v. F.T.C., 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959); P. Sorenson Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 246 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
P & D Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 245 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884
(1957) ; C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. F.T.C., 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), modified sub nom.
Moog Industries, Inc. v. F.T.C., 355 U.S. 411, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 968 (1958) ;
E. Edelmann & Co. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941
(1958) ; Whittaker Cable Corp. v. F.T.C, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
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